The forensic analysis of mobile handsets is becoming a more prominent factor in many criminal investigations. Despite such devices frequently storing relevant evidential content to support an investigation, accessing this information is becoming an increasingly difficult task due to enhanced effective security features. Where access to a device's resident data is not possible via traditional mobile forensic methods, in some cases it may still be possible to extract user information via queries made to an installed intelligent personal assistant. This article presents an evaluation of the information which is retrievable from Apple's Siri when interacted with on a locked iOS device running iOS 11.2.5 (the latest at the time of testing). The testing of verbal commands designed to elicit a response from Siri demonstrate the ability to recover call log, SMS, Contacts, Apple Maps, Calendar, and device information which may support any further investigation.
KEYWORDS: forensic science, iOS, Apple, mobile device forensics, Siri, intelligent personal assistants, investigation Modern day mobile device handset development has lead to a significant increase in their functionality. With over 2 million applications (Apps) reported to be available on Apple's App Store (1) , and 3.5 million on the Google Play Store (2), there is now an almost unlimited number of ways that a user can extend their handset's functionality beyond core mobile operations. Advancements in technology have also begun to shape the way in which a typical user interacts with their device, where an increase in the development and use of intelligent personal assistants (IPAs) incorporating forms of artificial intelligence and machine learning is being witnessed. Such examples include Apple's Siri and Samsung's Voice S (the two manufacturer market leaders for mobile device handsets (3), with the former being the focus of this article). Billed as methods for improving both user efficiency and user experience, IPAs are no longer just used to control and interact with basic handset tasks (calls, contacts, SMS, etc.), where now, their incorporation into 3rd party applications is simply a case of an App developer embedding this technology within their application's architecture. As the utilization of IPAs increases, their subsequent actions may become a source of potential evidential data, potentially recording and divulging user behavior for interpretation by a digital forensic analyst carrying out an examination of a suspect device.
Where suspected evidential interactions have occurred on a device, research and subsequent investigation of IPA usage on a handset may be required to establish any recorded information which may support an inquiry. As a result, the digital forensic research community is beginning to focus its attentions on the analysis of IPAs, with work documenting the functionality of Cortana (4-6) and Alexa (7, 8) already available. Typically IPA forensic research addresses the recovery of IPA usage logs which may contain information regarding how a user has interacted with their device, such as a user prompting an IPA to carry out a web search. Whilst this is beneficial in cases where such information is available, mobile device security and privacy mechanisms now means acquiring access to data resident on a device is becoming a greater challenge. The effective implementation of handset locking facilities on modern mobile devices may in some cases prevent a thorough examination of the device (e.g., see the difficulties posed during the "San Bernardino iPhone" case [9, 10] ). In such cases, access to handset data may be restricted in totality, or in some instances, partial access may be achieved by querying a resident IPA which may extend its functionality beyond a handset lock if configured to do so (see If an IPA can be queried on a locked device, a practitioner may be able to carry out basic handset recognizance, which in some cases may still offer information which could be of value during an investigation. However, currently there is limited academic work investigating the acquisition of information from such IPAs as a predominant source of evidence, particularly in cases involving a locked device. Although some blog-styled sources have alluded to Siri disclosures (see [11] ), this article provides a formal examination of Apple's Siri, and the subsequent disclosures it can make regarding a handset's resident information when operating on a locked iPhone 7 operating iOS version 11.2.5. Following the issuing of specific voice 1 Teesside University, Campus Heart, Southfield Road, Middlesbrough, TS1 3BX, UK.commands, responses are analysed and evaluated with potentially relevant evidential information highlighted.
Methodology
It is estimated that 38% of mobile phone owners in the United Kingdom have an Apple device (12), with global sales of the iPhone handsets estimated to be over 216 million (13) . This work focuses on the analysis of Siri due to its prominence, and the fact that it can be set up to permit interactions even when a device is locked. Further, in some cases, Siri can be configured to be accessible via simply pressing the "Home" button. In comparison, IPAs such as Samsung's "Voice S" (despite being accessible beyond a locked handset) are configured to respond only to a specific user's voice and therefore are unlikely to interact with a practitioner's voice when investigating the handset.
To evaluate the use of Siri for information reconnaissance purposes, a test iPhone 7 device was utilized running iOS version 11.2.5 (the latest at the time of testing). Prior to testing, resident content (uniquely identifiable test data) on the device was validated and recorded, ensuring that any issued Siri commands which return device content can be interpreted and validated as accurate. Appropriate test data were added to the test handset (noted in the following sections) to allow Siri commands to be effectively examined (e.g., SMS messages were sent to and stored on the device in order to test Siri's ability to read unread message data).
Is Siri On?
It is necessary to state from the start that an interrogation of Siri on locked iOS devices will not always be possible, where success is dependent on the configuration of a handset under investigation. Those in possession of a seized handset should be aware that Siri's functionality can be blocked from use when a handset is locked (see Fig. 2 , for Siri's iOS configuration settings). Where Siri is active, triggering its use can be performed in one of two ways; first pressing and holding the "Home" button, or by stating "Hey Siri." Where stating "Hey Siri" is the primary method for accessing Siri, when configured iOS would have prompted a user to issue five voice commands in order for the device to have learned a user's voice. During testing, where a device was set up using a separate user's voice, testing was still able to elicit a response from Siri, suggesting that even though an element of "learning a users voice" occurs on the handset, interactions with Siri may still not be beyond the capability of the practitioner.
Commands must be initially submitted verbally to Siri (although they can be edited textually if needed using keyboard input) where both audio and text responses are supplied (dependent on handset settings). Practitioners should also be aware of Siri's integration settings which indicate with applications are controllable via Siri.
Device Information
If a device is found separated from a suspect, initial reconnaissance for handset identification purposes via Siri may be necessary. Following tests, the command "who owns this iPhone" revealed the name associated with the Apple ID which has been synced with the device. The "Home" contact number which has been set for the account is also displayed. In terms of further recognizance, law enforcement with the proper authority may be able to use this information to request the disclosure of additional account information associated with these credentials.
In regard to applications which have been installed upon the device, this can be established by stating an application's name to Siri. Where a response requires the device to be unlocked, this indicates that the specific application is installed on the handset. Where an application has not been installed, Siri will respond "I don't see an app called <App Name>."
Contacts
Depending on a crime under investigation, contact information resident on a device can provide a relevant source of evidential information. In the case of locked devices, establishing whether a contact is on a device may be enough to trigger a wider investigation. In cases of device triage, where a contact is not present, this may help to remove a device from a case, preventing backlogs, decreasing collateral intrusion, and increasing the efficiency of an investigation.
Siri will interact with stored contacts on a device but will not directly reveal metadata such as contact numbers. However, indirect inferences can be made following appropriate voice commands. If a contact name is known, the voice command "contact <name>" will elicit one of two responses from Siri which can be interpreted in the follow way. If the contact is not in the handset address book, Siri will respond "I don't see <name> in your contacts." If there is a contact of the name requested, Siri will notify that user that the device "must be unlocked in order to perform that action." This process will also work if a nickname has been set for any resident contacts.
Calls
Applying similar principles as those noted for gathering contact information, limited call log information can be acquired utilising the following voice commands.
• "Last dialed"-The name of the contact which the handset last dialed. You will also receive an indication of when this was performed in two typical forms. If the last dialed is recent, it may be described as "today" or "yesterday." For more historical records, a date in format dd/mm/yyyy may be supplied. • "Missed call"-The name of the contact which the handset last missed a call from. The same metadata principles apply as with "last dialed" disclosures.
• "Last FaceTime/Missed FaceTime"-The same principles apply as above for Apple's FaceTime functionality.
• "Last dialed/Missed calls in <month>"-The last dialed/ missed call of the particular month in question. This only appears to work for the current year. For example, in 2018, commands to access months from 2017 and earlier did not work.
Calendar Entries
Calendar entries can be extracted via the command "calendar entries in <month>." For entries from previous years to be identified, the year must be stated using the command "calendar entries from the year <year>."
Messages
Siri will provide limited access to message information resident on the handset, where more details can be gleaned if the name of a relevant content can be identified (or guessed). The following command are of relevance.
• Recent Messages-This command will identify and read the most recent SMS message which is in the inbox but maintains an unread status. After the message has been read, its status on the handset is updated to read. No time and date information regarding the message is offered.
• Unread Messages-This command will identify the number of unread SMS messages in the Inbox and read their contents.
• Messages from <Name>-This command will provide access to (following testing) between 5 and 7 of the last messages which were received by a named contact.
Email
Unlike the messages application, the default email client on the handset provides limited content. If a contact is stored with an accompanying email, the command "email <name>" will trigger an email screen to be generated. A user can proceed to send an email from the lock screen. If there is no email address associated to a contact, Siri will warn that an action cannot be performed. It is not possible to identify the email address of the contact, only that one is stored. The testing of voice commands indicates that access to any email content stored within the client is not possible. If the default client has not been synced with an email account, Siri will acknowledge its inability to perform the email function.
As it is possible to establish that an email account has been synced to the device, using the previously discussed "who owns this iPhone" command, it may be possible to establish an accounts sign-up email address from Apple (following an account information disclosure request). This may be the same email used on the synced client, where depending on the email address type (Gmail, Outlook, etc.), a practitioner may be able to serve a disclosure request for account details and activity to the requisite email provider. Therefore, despite not having access to email content on the handset, Siri may provide enough information for a practitioner to seek to access to email account information via other means.
Maps
Interactions with Apple maps can be identified through the command "plot route to <destination name>." When a user saves destinations in their Apple Maps application, they have the option to tag them as "work" or "home." A request made to Siri will plot a location to the destination in question from your current location, potentially revealing a suspect's recorded place of work or home.
Locked iPhones
An iPhone which has been locked (through the use of a PIN code or biometric lock) poses an investigatory issue, particularly in newer handset models. Support offered by manufacturer in regard to gaining access to a device may be limited, and this position is stated by Apple who although may be able to support access to legacy models running iOS version 7 and below, are now unable to intervene.
For all devices running iOS 8.0 and later versions, Apple is unable to perform an iOS device data extraction as the data typically sought by law enforcement is encrypted, and Apple does not possess the encryption key. All iPhone 6 and later device models are manufactured running iOS 8.0 or a later version of iOS. (14) Currently, there are limited forensic methods for accessing resident iphone handset data when the device itself is locked, as noted by ElcomSoft Co. Ltd's, Vladimir Katalov (15) .
The only way to unlock the iPhone (5s and newer) is hardware-driven. For iOS 7 and earlier, as well as for some early 8.x releases, the process was relatively easy. With iOS 9 through 11, however, it is a headache. There is still a possibility to enter the device into the special mode when the number of passcode attempts is not limited and one can brute-force the passcode, albeit at a very low rate of up to several minutes per passcode. (15) However, organizations such as Cellebrite (16) offer a series of "advanced services" to law enforcement for the "unlocking and extraction for the latest Apple iOS devices including all iPhone models (iPhone 4S to iPhone X), iPad, iPad mini, iPad Pro, and iPod touch, running iOS 5 to iOS 11." Further, at the time of writing there is the recent emergence of a tool named "Greykey" by Grayshift (17) reportedly costing between $15,000 and $30,000 with functionality for unlocking iOS devices including the latest iPhone X model (18) . Whilst such provision offer potential device access, there are limitation both in terms of accessibility (external organizations dealing with private or outsourced work may not be able to utilize these services) and affordability. In some cases, the cost of either option may be too great to justify under existing organizational budgets, and as a result, practitioners may be restricted to laboratory analysis methods or via querying Siri using the commands noted within this article.
Where unlocking services or specialist unlocking software (such as that noted above) is not available, and, a handset has been powered on and subsequently locked, a chance of partial data recovery and potential access may exist. What is key to note is that in some cases a handset must have been powered on, booted through to the applications home screen then locked (i.e., unlocked at least once); a cold boot (a boot from a shutdown state into a lock screen) offers limited access to resident data. Where a handset is found in a locked but non-cold-boot state, it may be possible to extract data from the device if the suspect device has been previously synced to a computing platform (establishing a "trusted connection"), and this device is accessible and also seized, subject to investigation. Such procedures are discussed in depth by Vladimir (15, 19) . Assuming that extraction of data is potentially available from these methods, the issue of device protection is raised.
Carrying out this form of data extraction may take time, for example, requisite investigation of suspect devices is likely needed to identify the possibility of even extracting data in the manner in the first instance. Yet a remote wipe trigger signal takes seconds to initiate, and as a result, the practitioner faces both a gamble in terms of maintaining a device's integrity and also a need to carry out this work in a timely manner. Where a device maintains a networked connection, remote wiping services pose a tangible risk to the handset and reports of failed handling procedures have already resulted in data destruction (20) . In such cases, three options exist for those who seize a device on-scene. First, a device can be powered off, potentially compromising the accessibility of the device, as noted above. The second involves the use of faraday devices to shield the handset from network connections until a device can be suitably examined. Whilst an option, it relies on the availability of faraday equipment, which in cases of unplanned or spontaneous device seizures may not be available. In addition, there is a need for the ability to supply sustained power to the device due to battery drain caused by signal strength increases, without compromising signal protection. The final option is the ability to remove network connections from the device via the operating system itself. Given that by default, a locked device does not allow a user to physically navigate the operating system menus to configure the device, Siri offers an alternative.
Typically iPhones have two sources from which potential external contamination may occur: the Wi-Fi or data (network provider) connection. To prevent the chance of resident device data from being compromised, either each connection must be turned off, or the device placed in airplane mode, suspending wireless signal information to and from the handset (allowing the handset to adhere to airline regulation [21] ). Utilising Siri, the voice commands "data connection" and "Wi-Fi connection" provide access to the associated handset menu options where both can be turned off, placing the handset in a nonconnected state, whilst remaining powered on for a potential logical backup to be carried out. This process offers the chance to preserve the handsets data from any incoming wiping commands; however in doing so, no further Siri commands can be issued as Siri does not function without a networked connection. Therefore, for information reconnaissance purposes, it may be necessary to carry out the aforementioned commands relating to other handset functions (calls, contacts, etc.) before placing the device in this state.
Points of Note Regarding Data Integrity
Interactions via Siri can change data resident to the handset, and therefore, its use for reconnaissance must be evaluated. Where Siri provides possibly the only chance of acquiring any handset resident data, this may not be an issue. Asking Siri to "delete" content from within the locked screen will prompt the user to unlock the handset; therefore, direct removal of data is an unlikely threat. However, indirect actions resulting from Siri queries can change data. A summary of changes impacting the device are as follows.
• Asking Siri to read messages may change the status of a message if it is previously classed as unread.
• Interacting with call logs is a passive act, and however, a command which starts "call" will trigger a call event updating resident call logs.
• Interacting with SMS message logs is a passive act, and however, a command which starts "message" will trigger a create message event. A user can then state "cancel" to prevent this process from proceeding to send a message. Canceled actions do not result in messages being stored as drafts.
• As stated, information from the default email client is minimal, and Siri can send an email from the client whilst the handset is locked.
Given that additional actions can be added to the device, emphasis needs to be placed upon the use of contemporaneous notes to record interactions via Siri. This will allow practitioner created or modified data to be distinguished from a user's original actions, should the device be unlocked at a later date, providing for a full handset examination.
Using a range of voice commands, testing was unable to elicit any information from the following selection of Apps: "Photos," "Gmail," "Twitter," "FaceBook," "Safari" (other than to open a browser window or carry out a search), and WhatsApp. As a result, it appears that currently, Siri only interacts with core handset functions when operating beyond the handset lock screen.
Conclusions
This article has offered an insight into the type and quantity of potentially relevant information which can be obtained from Siri on a locked iPhone 7 running iOS version 11.2.5 for forensic investigation purposes. Testing has demonstrated the ability to recover some call log, SMS, Contacts, Apple Maps, Calendar, and device information. Whilst subject to Siri's settings, where a handset is configured to allow interactions with Siri when a device is locked, potentially relevant information can be acquired subject to issuing the correct commands. Future work is needed to expand the range of potential IPAs subject to testing, including 3rd party applications (nonvendor specific) and to evaluate the quantity and value of handset information disclosures. Further, as newer versions of iOS are frequently released Siri's functionality may differ, where constant evaluation is required to ensure relevant Siri commands are identified in future iterations of iOS.
